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Abstract—It is easy for humans to design passwords that
are easily remembered. However, such passwords may have
a predictable structure, making exhaustive search feasible.
We have divided human-generated passwords into three
categories: Non-word passwords, Mixture passwords, and
Word passwords; depending on their overall structure.
Within these categories, we have analyzed the search-space
reduction of several common password sub-structures. From
this analysis, we have derived guidelines that yield strong
passwords within in each password category. Our results
contribute towards the goal of achieving both strong and
memorable passwords.
Index Terms—Password security, password policy, search
space reduction, personnel authentication
I. INTRODUCTION
Passwords are only as strong as the password-designing
process. Random passwords can only be produced by ran-
dom password generators. However, the generated strings
might be difﬁcult to remember, especially if someone has
many accounts and therefore many different passwords.
Humans can easily create memorable passwords, but this
also creates the problem that their generation process is
guessable, e.g. following structures of certain language
[1] or themes [2]. Therefore, human-made passwords are
less secure than random passwords.
To help users to generate good passwords, there are
guidelines for password creation. However, such guide-
lines are very general, like those listed in [3], and may not
be helpful for all users, given the variety of memorizing
techniques. In order to overcome this problem, experts
generally recommend [4] a system for evaluating each
password against some metric and rejecting the weak
ones, rather than mandating a certain number of characters
from some character set.
The given guidelines are often based on the use of
common knowledge, and not based on scientiﬁc compu-
tations. Statements such as “Use at least 2 digits, 2 lower
case letters, 2 upper case letters, and 2 special characters”
might misleadingly guide users into designing passwords
with exactly the same number of characters and in the
same order as the above statement, such as 12asLK!?.
Such passwords are weaker than the guidance intends,
because it reveals a pattern to an adversary. The original
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meaning was to encourage users to design passwords
longer than 8 characters and with characters from all
available sets. If the characters were taken randomly from
each set, the password would have been quite strong.
In our work, we have computed how much information
the adversary gains when the password policy and the
generation process are revealed. Based on the ﬁndings
in [5], [6], we divided human-generated passwords into
three categories: Non-word passwords, Mixture pass-
words, and Word passwords. Non-word passwords are
character strings, which do not contain any real words that
are found in the dictionary, names, locations etc. However,
they can contain letters. Mixture passwords are character
strings containing both word and non-word part(s), e.g.
T!today65? has two non-word parts around the word
part in the middle. Word passwords are then strings,
which are either pure dictionary words, e.g. password or
modiﬁcations of them e.g. P@$$W0RD.
The ﬁndings of the information leakage are further
used to provide password-generation guidelines for each
password category, in such as way that, even if the
adversary knows the guidelines, the passwords generated
according to these guidelines can be considered as secure.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The
analysis is presented in Section II. Section III provides
the guidelines for password design. The comparison and
discussion of our results and the results of related work
is in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. ANALYSIS OF PASSWORD STRUCTURE
The analyzed cases are shown in Fig. 1. The minimal
information which the adversary would gain is the gen-
eral password policy. In this paper, the basic policy is
“Minimum length of 8 characters, maximum length of 14
characters and all visible keyboard keys (except space)
are allowed.” With a Norwegian keyboard, the number
of characters is then 105 and therefore, the maximum
password entropy is 94.01 bits, computed as follows
log2
14 X
i=8
105i = 94;01 bits: (1)
This baseline is used when the revealed information is
computed with the following formula
HCase = 94;01   log2CCase: (2)
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Figure 1. The analysis cases of our study.
We call a password a good password, when, given
information about the password structure, the revealed
information in bits is less than half of the baseline bits,
i.e. less than 47 bits.
In the next case, in addition to general policy, the
adversary knows the length of the password. The rest of
the analysis is divided into three cases: A Non-word, a
Mixture and a Word password. A Non-word password
does not contain any Norwegian words, a Mixture pass-
word contains both Norwegian words or a word and extra
characters, and Word passwords contain only words. We
use four character sets (digits jDj = 10 (cardinality),
lower case jLCj = 29 and upper case letters jUCj = 29,
and special characters jSCj = 37). Because we do not
have statistics of the most commonly used password char-
acters, we assume a uniform distribution, when selecting
characters from each of the above character sets.
A. Knowing the Password Length
In this case, the adversary knows only the system
guidelines and length of a password. When only the length
l, in addition to the number of the allowed characters cs,
is known, the size of the effective search space is
CLength = csl: (3)
The use of Formula 3 gives us following results: With an
8-characters password, the adversary knows 40.3 bits and
with a 14 characters long password, the adversary knows
0.01 bits. If the adversary learns that a password was
actually 7 characters long, he would have learned 47 bits.
This suggests that passwords shorter than 8 characters are
not good.
B. Human Design Passwords
Password strength depends on the password-design
process. Maximum password strength is achieved when
each password character is drawn independently and a
uniform distribution is used. Usually, this is not the case
when people design their own passwords.
Human-designed passwords can be Non-word, Mixture
or Word passwords. Non-word password do not contain
sub-strings that can be found in a dictionary e.g NT*-
Ke0, Mixture passwords contain some words and extra
characters e.g 4seasons1year and Word passwords contain
only words e.g SkiingIsTheBestIKnow. We show which
design processes within each category provide good pass-
words and which do not. The analysis shows that the
main criterion for designing good passwords is to vary the
characters used and the placements of characters within
each password-design session.
Non-word passwords. The analysis is divided into four
sub cases.
 NWrapu: reused characters are allowed and the
pattern of character placement in a password is
unknown.
 NWrapk: reused characters are allowed and the
pattern of character placement in a password is
known.
 NWrdpu: reused characters are denied and the
pattern of character placement in a password is
unknown.
 NWrdpk: reused characters are denied and the
pattern of character placement in a password is
known.
We assume that if a person always designs passwords
with the same structure, the pattern of the password is
known.
Computations. The size of the Non-word password
search space is
CNonWord = f1g1  f2g2  f3g3  f4g4   W; (4)
where functions gi, computed with (5)-(8), give the car-
dinality of each character set used in a password and
functions fj, computed with (9)-(12), give the number
of all possible combinations of character placement for
each set in a password of length l. W stand for the
number of possible words within letter combinations.
These combinations are subtracted from the total number
of the combinations, because Non-word passwords do
not contain words. In these formulae, uc stands for the
number of upper case letters, lc for lower case letters, d
for digits, and sc for special characters.
The cardinality functions gi are as follows
g1(uc) =

29uc; reuse allowed
29!
(29 uc)!; reuse denied (5)
g2(lc) =

29lc; reuse allowed
29!
(29 lc)!; reuse denied (6)
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
10d; reuse allowed
10!
(10 d)!; reuse denied (7)
g4(sc) =

37sc; reuse allowed
37!
(37 sc)!; reuse denied (8)
Equations (9)-(12) are character-placement combination
functions. These functions will get a value 1 if the pattern
of the password is known. In other words, the adversary
knows which characters in a password are digits, upper
case letters, etc. When the pattern is unknown, the place-
ment combinations are computed as follows
f1(l;uc) =

l
uc

(9)
f2(l;uc;lc) =

l   uc
lc

(10)
f3(l;uc;lc;d) =

l   uc   lc
d

(11)
f4(l;uc;lc;d;sc) =

l   uc   lc   d
sc

(12)
The number of passwords containing single or multiple
words with a length of (uc + lc) letters written both
forwards and in reverse transformation, W, is computed
with (13). We have simpliﬁed the subtraction, considering
only the passwords containing words formed from all the
letters in a particular password. The number of words,
aw, shown in Table III, were provided by the Norwegian
Text Laboratory.
W = [l (uc+lc)+1]2awf3g3f4g4: (13)
Example. As an example of the use of formulae, we
show a situation in which a 10- character password (l =
10) contains 1 digit (d = 1), 1 lower case letter (lc = 1), 4
upper case letters (uc = 4) and 4 special characters (sc =
4). The reuse of the characters is allowed and the pattern is
unknown. The number of words with a length of 5 letters
is taken from Table III. Because the reuse of characters
is allowed, we obtain the following cardinalities for the
sets
g1(4) = 294
g2(1) = 29
g3(1) = 10
g4(4) = 374:
(14)
The combinations of the character placements will then
be
f1(10;4) =
 10
4

= 210
f2(10;4;1) =
 10 4
1

= 6
f3(10;4;1;1) =
 10 4 1
1

= 5
f4(10;4;1;1;4) =
 10 4 1 1
1

= 1:
(15)
These will then yield the search space size of
C = 210  294  6  29  5  10  374
 [10   (4 + 1) + 1]  2  20767  5  10  374
= 2:42  1018
(16)
which will reveal information of
H = 94;01   log22:42  1018 = 32:9 bits: (17)
TABLE I.
REVEALED KNOWLEDGE OF NON-WORD PASSWORDS. THE USED
SETS ARE DIGITS (D), UPPER CASE (UC) AND LOWER CASE LETTERS
(LC), AND SPECIAL CHARACTERS (SC). THE NUMBERS IN EACH
CHARACTER SET COLUMN GIVE THE NUMBER OF CHARACTERS
USED FROM EACH SET IN THE PASSWORD-DESIGN PROCESS. GOOD
PASSWORDS ARE IN BOLD.
Pw Nr Nr Nr Nr NW- NW- NW- NW-
L D LC UC SC rapu rapk rdpu rdpk
Bits Bits Bits Bits
10 10 0 0 0 60.8 60.8 72.2 72.2
9 1 0 0 55.9 59.3 64.0 67.4
8 1 1 0 51.2 57.7 57.0 63.5
0 0 0 10 41.9 41.9 43.8 43.8
0 0 1 9 38.9 42.3 40.5 43.8
0 1 1 8 36.1 42.6 37.3 43.8
0 0 5 5 35.7 43.7 36.6 44.6
1 4 4 1 34.0 46.6 34.6 47.2
1 1 4 4 32.9 45.6 33.5 46.1
0 2 3 5 32.4 43.7 33.0 44.3
8 8 0 0 0 67.4 67.4 73.2 73.2
6 1 0 1 58.2 64.0 60.9 66.7
0 0 0 8 52.3 52.3 53.5 53.5
1 1 0 6 48.8 54.6 49.4 55.2
0 0 4 4 47.6 53.7 48.2 54.3
1 1 1 5 46.5 54.9 46.9 55.3
2 2 2 2 46.2 57.5 46.5 57.8
0 1 3 4 45.6 53.7 46.0 54.1
1 1 3 3 45.5 55.6 45.8 55.9
0 3 3 2 45.3 54.4 45.7 54.8
1 3 2 2 45.3 56.0 45.5 56.2
0 2 3 3 45.0 54.1 45.3 54.4
Other examples of the information revealed in each of
four cases with a password length of 8 and 10 are shown
in Table I.
Results. In summary, passwords are not good if they
consist only of digits, or of digits and letters only either
from the lower case letter set or the upper case letter set.
The best passwords contain some special characters and
characters from other sets, so that the number of digits is
as low as possible.
When concentrating only on strong passwords (the bold
entropies in Table I, we ﬁnd the following. Comparison
of the ”reuse of characters allowed” -columns (NWrapu
and NWrapk) to ”reuse of characters denied” -columns
(NWrdpu and NWrdpk), shows that the revealed informa-
tion is rather similar. When characters are from several
sets and the most of them are not digits the difference
between cases gets smaller, and so do the actual revealed
information entropies.
The difference in bits is signiﬁcant, when comparing
”pattern-unknown” columns (NWrapu and NWrdpu) with
”pattern-known” columns (NWrapk and NWrdpk). This
ﬁnding strongly supports the need to change the character
pattern in each password-design session. According to
Table I, it is possible to design a good Non-word password
of length of 8 characters.
Mixture passwords. Mixture passwords contain both a
word and a non-word component. The following analysis
is divided into two sub-cases with three different possibil-
ities for the extra character set comprising either a set of
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Here, we consider only those cases where the reuse of
characters is denied.
 Mpu: the placement pattern of the word(s) and extra
character(s) is unknown.
 Mpk: the placement pattern of the word(s) and extra
character(s) is known.
In order to compute the worst case scenarios, we only
consider dictionary words as words, not their modiﬁca-
tion. Their modiﬁcation is discussed further in the section
below on Word passwords.
Computations. The size of the Mixture password search
space is
CMixture = cwocpe(
w Y
p=1
awp(lwp))
es!
(es   n)!
; (18)
where aw(lw) is the number of lw -length words, w the
number of words, es the size of the extra character set and
n the number of extra characters used in non-word parts
of password. The combination of different word orders
cwo is computed with (19), where wsl is number of same-
length words. The combinations of extra character places
between words cpe was noted, so as to follow the numbers
in Pascal’s Triangle, which is then used to compute (20).
Again, if the pattern is known, then (19) and (20) are 1. If
the pattern is unknown, then the formulae are as follows
cwo =
w!
wsl!
(19)
cpe =
k X
i=1

n   1
i   1

w + 1
i

; (20)
where n  1 and k = min(n;(w + 1)).
Example. As an example of the use of the formulae, we
show a case where a password contains 2 words (w = 2),
both with a length of 3 letters (wsl = 2), and 4 digits
(n = 4, es = 10). The possible word order combinations
are
cwo =
2!
2!
= 1 (21)
and the possible placement combinations among digits
and words are
cpe =
3 X
i=1

4   1
i   1

2 + 1
i

= 15: (22)
These yields the following search space size
C = 15  (30482)
10!
(10   4)!
= 7:02  1011; (23)
which leads to revealed information of
H = 94;01   log2(7:02  1011) = 54:7 bits: (24)
Some other examples of the revealed information of
Mixture passwords with a length of 8 and 10 characters
are shown in Table II.
Results. The revealed information entropies in Table II
show that a good Mixture password cannot be shorter than
10 characters. Furthermore, even with 10 characters, only
TABLE II.
REVEALED INFORMATION OF MIXTURE PASSWORDS. THE USED
SETS ARE DIGITS, D, SPECIAL CHARACTERS, SC, AND
COMBINATION OF DIGITS AND SPECIAL CHARACTERS, DSC. EC
STANDS FOR EXTRA CHARACTERS. GOOD PASSWORDS ARE IN BOLD.
Pw Word L+ Mpu Mpu Mpu Mpk Mpk Mpk
L Nr EC D SC DSC D SC DSC
10 9 + 1 74.2 72.3 72.0 75.2 73.3 73.0
6,3 + 1 61.7 59.8 59.5 64.3 62.4 62.1
6 + 4 64.6 56.3 54.8 66.9 58.6 57.2
5,4 + 1 60.3 58.4 58.1 62.9 61.0 60.7
5,3 + 2 58.0 54.1 53.4 61.6 57.7 57.0
4,4 + 2 58.0 54.2 53.5 60.6 56.7 56.0
4,3 + 3 55.2 49.2 48.1 59.5 53.5 52.4
3,3,3 + 1 54.0 52.1 51.7 56.0 54.1 53.7
3,3 + 4 54.7 46.4 44.9 58.6 50.3 48.8
3 + 7 60.2 43.8 41.2 63.2 46.8 44.2
8 7 + 1 74.5 72.6 72.3 75.5 73.6 73.3
6 + 2 71.1 67.2 66.5 72.7 68.8 68.1
5 + 3 68.2 62.2 61.1 70.2 64.2 63.1
4,3 + 1 63.1 61.2 60.9 65.7 63.8 63.4
4 + 4 65.9 57.6 56.2 68.3 60.0 58.5
3,3 + 2 61.8 57.9 57.2 64.4 60.5 59.8
3 + 5 65.0 54.2 52.4 67.6 56.8 55.0
a small number of the passwords can really be considered
as good.
The difference in revealed information between ”un-
known” and ”known pattern” is a couple of bits based on
a comparison of the columns Mpu and Mpk. However, the
amount of revealed information in the D, SC, and DSC
-columns show that the use of extra characters from the
larger set, yield a much stronger password. The impact is
greater, when most of the password characters are extra
ones and do not belong to a word-part.
From the above, it can be concluded that the best
Mixture passwords consist of a short word (or couple
of short words) and many extra characters from a large
character set. The short word in our computation was
noticed to be a word less than half of the length of the
complete password. For instance, for a password of 10
characters, the short words can have a length of 3 and 4
characters.
Word passwords. By pure Word passwords, we mean
passwords which contain dictionary words only. The
password either contains only one word with the length
of the password itself, or several shorter words, with the
total length of the words constituting the total length of
the password. The analysis of words from one language
is divided into two sub-cases.
 Wmod: the modiﬁed words are used and the place-
ment pattern of the words is unknown.
 Wdic: the dictionary words are used and the place-
ment pattern of the words is unknown.
It has been shown above that a variation of character
placements in each password-design session makes pass-
words more secure. In the case of Word passwords, the
variation is done by using different word lengths. This
means that the effect of variation is smaller than in other
cases, because there are fewer words than characters in a
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NUMBER OF NORWEGIAN WORDS. THE STATISTICS WERE OBTAINED
FROM THE OSLO CORPUS COLLECTION BY NORWEGIAN TEXT
LABORATORY, TEKSTLABORATORIET ILN, OSLO, NORWAY.
Word length, l Number of words, aw
3 3048
4 11145
5 20767
6 29043
7 36590
8 42805
9 45762
10 44956
password. However, we consider that even if the password
structure were same, a change in words makes it possible
to use different word lengths. For example, ABussIsWhite
has a different word-length structure than a password with
a similar theme password such as TheTruckWasBrown.
Therefore, we only consider cases in which the word
placement pattern in a password is unknown.
In our work, we only compute revealed information
entropies when only one language is used, and we decided
to use the statistics for Norwegian words. However, the
formulae provided are also suitable for other languages.
Computations. The size of the Word password search
space is
CWord = cwo
w Y
p=1
awp(lwp); (25)
where cwo is the order combination of different words
(computed with (19)), w is the number of words, and
awp(lwp) is the amount of lwp -length words. Table III
shows the number of Norwegian words with a length of
3-10 letters.
Results. The results for the 8, 10, and 12-character
passwords are shown in Table IV. In the Wmod case,
both forward and reverse transformations are taken into
account. The modiﬁcations are: all letters are lower case,
all letters are upper case, only the ﬁrst letter is upper case,
only the last letter is upper case, the consonants are upper
case and the vowels upper case.
The results in Table IV show that the use of original
dictionary words does not make passwords secure, es-
pecially, if only one or two words are used. The best
approach is to use several short words, with different
lengths, in one password. Here also, the length of the short
word is less than half of the original password length.
The use of modiﬁed words makes the passwords stronger.
However, if the modiﬁcation is always done in the same
manner, the use of modiﬁcation reduces the password
space as much as use of original dictionary words.
It is possible to design strong Word passwords, but not
with pure dictionary words. A good Word password need
to consist of digits, upper case and lower case letters, and
special characters. The substitution and rotation should
be done differently each time and also differently in each
password. A good Word password should have at least 12
characters and consists of several short, modiﬁed words.
TABLE IV.
REVEALED INFORMATION OF WORD PASSWORDS. GOOD
PASSWORDS ARE IN BOLD.
Pw Word Wmod Wdic
L L bits bits
12 12 75.1 78.7
9,3 58.8 66.0
8,4 57.0 64.2
7,5 56.3 63.5
6,6 57.2 64.4
6,3,3 43.7 54.5
5,4,3 41.3 52.1
4,4,4 42.9 53.7
3,3,3,3 33.4 47.7
10 10 75.0 78.6
7,3 59.1 66.3
6,4 57.6 64.7
5,5 58.2 65.3
4,3,3 45.1 55.8
8 8 75.0 78.6
5,3 59.9 67.1
4,4 60.0 67.1
The modiﬁed Word passwords look like Mixture pass-
words, but, because they are constructed from dictionary
words, the underlying word pattern makes them weaker
than Mixture-words. We do not have statistics specifying
which letters are modiﬁed and by which other character,
but it can be assumed that substitution by people follows
the certain pattern.
The number of dictionary entries is small compared to
the total size of the password search space. However, the
actual size of word-sets used in passwords might be even
smaller. People have tendency to use theme words [2], [7]
such as name of the sport teams, food, and animals. The
size of such themes is very small and the use of words
only from one theme makes password design process very
weak.
III. PASSWORD FORMATION GUIDELINES
A good password is complex, but nonetheless easy
to remember [8]. The password policy should be such
that it combines individual password design processes,
while helping users to generate secure passwords with
their own methods. In Section II, we showed that good
passwords can be created in each category, if there are
enough variations in pattern and character. Variations
provide good defences against attacks based on language
structures e.g. fast dictionary attack in [1].
In order to design good passwords, we propose the
following guidelines.
Non-word password design.
1) A password should be longer than 8 characters.
2) Use characters from all character sets, so that more
characters come from the large character sets than
from the small sets.
3) Vary the number of characters from each set in each
construction session.
4) Vary the patterns of character placement.
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1) A password should be longer than 10 characters.
2) Use either one short, modiﬁed word and many extra
characters or several short (not the same length),
modiﬁed words and a few extra characters from
large character set.
3) Avoid using same theme.
Word password design.
1) A password should have more than 12 characters.
2) Use many short and modiﬁed words.
3) Avoid using same theme.
4) Use variation when modifying.
5) Use different languages and language combination
when designing a new password.
Note that the length of a short word is less than half
of the length of the password.
IV. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
When designing passwords and password policies,
users should also develop an understanding that pass-
words are not only vulnerable against brute-force attack,
but also against much more sophisticated attacks. A
common denominator of the latter is password search
space reduction. After reduction, the attacks, be they
brute-force or dictionary attacks in smaller search spaces,
become faster and therefore constitute a far more serious
threat.
In our study, the reduction of password search space
is computed from the adversary’s acquired knowledge on
the password policy and the password-generation process.
More sophisticated methods for password search space
reduction are presented in [1], [9]–[11].
Trostle [9] describe timing attacks against the trusted
path mechanism. Only a few trials were needed to obtain
the length of the password with the ﬁrst attack type. The
second attack continued to obtain leakage and was able
to reduce the strength of a password by 2-3 bits per
character.
In a study of Song et al. [10], the use of keystroke
latency information in timing attacks toward passwords
in the Secure Shell was analyzed. Typing patterns were
estimated and, with the help of latency information, the
strength of a password was reduced by 1.2 bits per
character pair.
In [1] Narayanan and Shmatikov reduced the password
search space by using Markov modelling techniques of
natural language processing. They claim that the distribu-
tion of letters in easily remembered passwords is similar
to the distribution of letters in the users’ native language.
Based on this concept, they combined an algorithm which
enables a fast dictionary attack. First Markov ﬁlters are
used to reduce the size of the password search space, and
then, the remaining search space is efﬁciently enumerated
and in the ﬁnal stage, time-space trade off techniques are
used to conduct a fast dictionary attack.
Markov ﬁlters and English language structures were
also in use when Zhuang et al. [11] presented their
keyboard acoustic emanation attack. They recorded 10
minutes of English text and were able to recover 96%
of the typed characters.
In the NIST Special Publication on Electronic Authenti-
cation Guidelines [12], the use of three different password
policies were evaluated and the minimum password guess-
ing entropies, versus password length for each policy,
were estimated. Compared to NIST evaluation, we used
the password analysis based on textual meta-information,
and went one step deeper, by studying human password
design processes.
More password policies and their relationship to user
memorability, password entropy and password change
frequency were simulated and analyzed by Shay et al.
[7]. They noted, as had many before [13], [14], that
if a password policy does not require sufﬁciently com-
plex passwords, users’ passwords are in danger of being
cracked. If a policy requires overly complex passwords,
users may have problems to recall them and therefore may
write them down.
Password generation process and structure were studied
in [5], [6]. MySpace phishing attack analysis [6] showed
that 65% of passwords were 8 characters or less long and
81% of passwords were alphanumeric, which, in most
cases, contained lower case letters with a single digit at
the end. In one third of the cases, the digit was 1. Brown
et al. in [5] found that 65% of passwords were generated
from information relating to the user himself. Almost
one third of these were names. The next largest groups
were dates, and ID and phone numbers. Three quarters of
the passwords contained the full information. There was
only a modiﬁcation of the information in less than 5% of
the passwords. These ﬁndings suggest that users generate
passwords with minimum length and structure and even
the content is familiar. The users of these studies cited
above, would beneﬁt from our password policies.
Based on our analysis, we are able to provide concrete
guidelines for password policy construction in each pass-
word category: Non-Word, Mixture and Word password.
This allows users to develop their own password style
and still create memorable passwords, while keeping the
structure of passwords complex enough to ensure security.
Passwords constructed according to guidelines are strong,
even if these guidelines are available to the adversary.
An educational tool [15] based on the ﬁndings and
guidelines of this paper, has been made to help users
measure the quality of their password and also to design
stronger passwords.
V. CONCLUSION
People are able to design memorable passwords, es-
pecially if they can use their own password-designing
processes. These processes can produce passwords which
we have divided further into three categories: Non-word
passwords, Mixture passwords, and Word passwords.
Within these categories, we have provided formulae and
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ferent password policies. Based on this analysis, we have
compared how effective password space is affected by
policy decisions. We have computed how valuable a
knowledge of password policy is for an adversary, in
terms of reduced password entropy and consequently,
a reduction in the necessary search space. Based on
computations of typical password sizes (8-14 characters),
we have provided guidelines for password policy con-
struction. These guidelines identify policy statements that
help to reduce the loss of password entropy.
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